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This paper provides a model of individual decisionmaking in the presence of 
neighborhood effects.  By neighborhood effects, we refer to interdependencies between 
individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of others within a common 
neighborhood.  As such, neighborhood effects are forms of social interactions; in fact the terms 
would seem to be interchangeable in many contexts.  
Within economics, there has developed an increasing recognition that neighborhood 
effects play a possibly major role in explaining a range of individual behaviors; rich empirical 
and theoretical literatures have developed.  A failing of much of this work is the absence of 
strong connections between theory and empirics.  This paper addresses this limitation by 
providing a model of multinomial choice with neighborhood effects.  The model represents a 
generalization of the binary choice model of William Brock and Steven Durlauf (2001a,b).  The 
model is econometrically implementable and so has the potential of allowing for structural 
estimation of neighborhood effects.  
Section I outlines a basic choice model with neighborhood effects.  Section II specializes 
the structure using a multinomial logit framework.  Section III considers econometric 
implementation. Section IV discusses some limitations of the framework and proposes some 
research directions.  Proofs of all theorems may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001c). 
I. Models of neighborhood effects 
We consider I individuals who are members of a common neighborhood.  Our objective 
is to characterize the individual choices of each i,  i ω  (made from some set  i Ω ) and the vector of  2 
neighborhood choices ω .  From the perspective of theoretical modeling, it is useful to 
distinguish between three types of behavioral determinants: a vector  i h  of deterministic (to the 
modeler) characteristics, a vector  i ε  of random characteristics, and the subjective beliefs an 
individual has about behaviors in the neighborhood, represented as a conditional probability 
measure  ()
e
i µω .  Individual choices  i ω  are described as maximizing some payoff function V , 
  () () argmax , , ,
i
e
ii i i Vh λ ωλ µ ω ε ∈Ω =   (1) 
This basic choice model is closed by imposing self-consistency between beliefs and conditional 
probabilities, so that 
  () () () , 
ee
ii i hi µω µ ω µω =∀   (2) 
where the right hand of this equation is the objective probability measure generated by the 
model; self-consistency is equivalent to rational expectations in the usual sense.  From the 
perspective of modeling individual behaviors, it is typically assumed that agents do not account 
for the effect of their choices on the decisions of others via expectations formation. In this sense, 
this framework embodies an expectations form of a Nash equilibrium. 
This generic structure illustrates how neighborhood models can preserve the individual 
choice-based logic of microeconomics.  Their novelty lies in the interdependencies in choices 
induced by including  ()
e
i µω as an argument in individual payoffs and imposing self-consistency.   
II. Multinomial choice and neighborhood effects 
i.  basic setup 
In order to understand the implications of neighborhood effects for equilibrium behavior, 
it is necessary to specialize this general behavioral description.  We do this in three steps.  First,  3 
we assume that each agent faces a common choice set with L discrete possibilities, i.e. 
{} 0,1, , 1 i L Ω= − K .  Second, we assume that each choice l produces utility for i according to: 
  ,, ,,
e
il il il il VhJ pε =+ +  (3) 
Here,  , il h  denotes the deterministic private utility agent i receives from the choice,  ,
e
il Jp  denotes 
the social utility from the choice, and  , il ε  denotes random private utility from the choice.  The 
social utility term contains both a measure of the strength of social utility,  J , and the agent’s 
expectation of the percentage of agents in the neighborhood who make the same choice  ,
e
il p . This 
is the natural generalization of the conformity effect model in Brock and Durlauf (2001a) and is 
also employed in Patrick Bayer and Christopher Timmins (2001).  Third, we assume that the 
errors  , il ε  are independent across i and are doubly exponentially distributed with index 























  (4) 
The parameter β  measures the dispersion in the random utility terms; higher β  implies lower 
variance. When there are only two choices, this is the model studied in Brock and Durlauf 

























  (5) 
where  l p  is the objective expected value of the percentage of agents in the neighborhood who 
choose  l and  h F  is the empirical probability distribution of  , ij h .  It is straightforward to verify 
that under the Brouwer fixed point theorem, at least one such fixed point exists.  4 
ii. properties 
To understand the properties of this model, it is useful to focus on the special case where 
, 0 , il hi l =∀.  For this special case, the choice probabilities (and hence the expected distribution 
of choices within a neighborhood) are completely determined by the compound parameter  J β .  
A primary question is whether and how the presence of interdependencies produces multiple 
equilibria for the choice probabilities in a neighborhood.  
To get some intuition as to how  J β affects the number of equilibria, it is useful to 
consider the extreme cases  0 J =  and  J =∞.  When  0 J = , then it is obvious that  1 l pL = .  
This equilibrium is also present when  J =∞.  However, others will exist as well.  For any pair 











=   (6) 
It is immediate that any set of equilibrium probabilities that are bounded away from 0 will 
become equal as  J ⇒∞.  This condition is necessary as well as sufficient, so any configuration 
such that  1 l pb =  for some subset of b  choices and  0 l p =  for the other Lb −  choices is an 










 ∑  different equilibrium probability 
configurations.  
These examples lead naturally to the question of the relationship between  J β and 
changes in the number of equilibria.  In order to do this, it is convenient to rewrite (4) and (5) so 
as to measure the deviation of choice probabilities from  0 l = ; i.e. we work with  0 ll mpp =−.  

























  (7) 
where self-consistency imposes 
e
ll mm = .  The Jacobian matrix of (7) possesses diagonal 
elements 
  () () () ()
2





JJ m J m JJ m m
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ββ β ββ − ∂
=−
∂
  (8) 
and off-diagonal elements 
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 ∑ .  When  , 0 , il hi l =∀, 0,  1, , 1 l ml L == − K  is an equilibrium 
with associated Jacobian matrix elements 
e
ll mm J L β ∂∂=  and  0
e
lj mm ∂∂=  for lj ≠ . This 
implies that  0,  1, , 1 l ml L == − K  is a stable equilibrium if 01 JL β <<  and is an unstable 
equilibrium otherwise.  In turn, if this equilibrium is unstable, then other equilibria must exist; 
details may be found in Brock and Durlauf (2001c), where the following is proved.  
     
Theorem.  Multiple equilibria in the multinomial logit model with neighborhood effects 
Suppose that individual choices are characterized by (4) with self-consistent beliefs, i.e., by (5).  
Assume that  , 0 , il hi l =∀. Then there will exist multiple self-consistent choice probabilities if 
1 JL β > . 
When  2 L = , this theorem reduces to the description of multiple equilibria with binary 
choices in Brock and Durlauf (2001a).  The theorem also explains simulation evidence in Bayer  6 
and Timmins (2001) which indicated that multiple equilibria seem less likely the more choices 
involved.  This theorem makes their finding precise.  Intuitively, the reason that the number of 
choices raises the threshold value of  J β  necessary for multiple equilibria is the assumption that 
the random utility terms are independent.  This independence means that the percentage of 
indivduals in a population whose behavior is determined by their random utility (because of an 
extremely large draw for one of the choices relative to the others) increases in the number of 
choices, leaving a smaller percentage of the population susceptible to self-consistent bunching 
due to the endogenous effect  l Jp . 
In order to understand the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibria of this 
model, it useful to consider an analogous social planner’s problem when the planner￿s objective 
is to maximize overall utility in the neighborhood.  Following ideas in Brock (1993) and 
elaborated in the present context in Brock and Durlauf (2001a), one can interpret a social 
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== ∑   (11) 
with  () 1 i l ω =  denoting the indicator function for the choice of  l by agent i.  In contrasting this 
with the probability measure over choices associated with the noncooperative equilibrium (the 
product of (4) across i), the key difference is that the social planner’s problem uses empirical  7 
probabilities in modeling the interdependence of individual choices.  This is natural since a 
planner can account for how the choices of one actor affects others in ways that are ruled out in 
the noncooperative case. 
It can be shown, using techniques from statistical mechanics, that as 
* ￿ ,   lw l Ip p l ⇒∞ ⇒ ∀ , (wdenotes weak convergence) where the vector 
* p with typical element 
*
l p  solves  
 
*1 argmax lim ln pI I pI Z
−
⇒∞ =   (12) 
The first order necessary conditions for this maximization are such that they produce the same 
functional form as produced for choice probabilities in the noncooperative model we have 
described, except that  J  is replaced by 2J  for the planner.  The 2 appears because the spillovers 
flowing from each agent i to others are accounted for by the social planner in contrast to the 
"Nash noncooperative" equilibrium.  Further, the social planner’s solution also involves a 
selection rule when there is more than one set of configurations that are possible equilibria of the 
noncooperative model.  The reason is that the social planner always picks that configuration that 
maximizes his objective.  See Brock (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a) for elaboration. 
III. Econometric implementation 
An essential justification for the functional form assumptions we have placed on our 
neighborhood model is that they permit explicit econometric analysis.  The multinomial logit 
property for the individual choices allows one to construct a likelihood function for data taken 
for individuals across neighborhoods.  Since a typical data set will contain observations on 
individuals in different neighborhoods, we generalize our notation so that  () ni denotes the 
neighborhood of agent i; ω  is now the vector of choices in a given cross-neighborhood sample  8 
of individuals. Finally, each individual within a neighborhood is modeled as possessing identical 
beliefs about the percentage of choices within the neighborhood, so that for choice l in 
neighborhood  () nithere is a common expected percentage  () ,
e
ni l p .   
In empirical work on neighborhood effects the generic deterministic private incentive  , il h  
is usually assumed to depend on two types of observables: an r-dimension vector of individual 
characteristics  i X  and an s-dimension vector of neighborhood characteristics  () ni Y , also known as 
contextual effects. Charles Manski (1993) provides the first formal discussion of this dichotomy. 
Operationally, it is standard to assume 
 
  () , . il l l i l ni hk c X d Y ′′ =+ +   (13) 
 
There is no necessary reason why the same elements of  i X  and  () ni Y  should affect the payoff of 
each choice; one can allow for this by setting particular elements of  l c  and  l d  to zero.  The 
likelihood function for a collection of choices ω  will therefore be proportional to 
  () () () () () , exp 1
e
ll il l i ni ni l
il
kc Xd Y J p l ββ β β ω ′′ ++ + = ∏∏   (14) 
subject to the constraints that for each neighborhood  () ni, 
  () () () () () , E1 ,
e
j ni l ni pl Y j n i ω ==∈   (15) 
This constraint simply imposes self-consistency in expected choice probabilities across 
neighborhoods and choices.  For technical reasons, it is useful to constrain each agent’s 
information set to  () ni Y .  As is standard for multinomial logit models, the complete set of model  9 
parameters is not identified.  It is therefore necessary to impose some normalizations; we follow 
Daniel McFadden (1984, pp.1413) and assume  00 0 0 0,  0,   0 ,  0 kc dJ == = =  and  =1 β . 
As originally recognized in Manski (1993) and further analyzed in Robert Moffitt (2001) 
and Brock and Durlauf (2001b), there are possible identification problems in neighborhood 
models due to the relationship between contextual effects  () ni Y  and the equilibrium expected 
neighborhood choice shares  () , ni l p . Specifically, Manski (1993) shows how for a class of linear 
models of neighborhood effects, collinearity between particular contextual effects and 
endogenous effects (variables such as our  () , ni l p ￿s that represent self-consistent beliefs about 
aspects of behaviors in the neighborhood) can induce nonidentification.  However, in contrast to 
the linear case, identification can hold for our model, as described in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem. Identification of the multinomial choice model with neighborhood effects 
Let the true data generating process be given by (14)-(15) with the normalization     
00 0 0 0,  0,   0 ,  0 kc dJ == = =  and  =1 β .  Assume i) the joint support of  () , i ni XY  is not contained 
in a proper linear subspace of 
rs R
+ , ii) the support of  () ni Y  is not contained in a proper linear 
subspace of
s R , iii) no element of  i X  or  () ni Y  is constant, iv) for each choice l, there exists at 
least one neighborhood  l n  such that conditional on 
l n Y , i X  is not contained in a proper linear 
subspace of  
r R , v) none of the elements of  () ni Y  possesses bounded support, vi)  () , ni l p  is not 
constant across neighborhoods, and vii) the random utility terms for each individual are 
independent of his associated  i X  and  () ni Y .  Then the true set of model parameters 
() 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  is identified relative to any distinct alternative.  10 
 
The proof of this theorem is involved, and is a generalization of a theorem on identification of 
neighborhood effects for binary choices found in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b).  The key to 
identification in this model is that because models of discrete choice are inherently nonlinear, in 
the sense that since choice probabilities are bounded, contextual effects and endogenous effects 
(in this case, the choice probabilities) cannot be linearly dependent.  What the theorem in essence 
does is require that 1) there is enough intraneighborhood variation in at least one neighborhood 
to ensure that  l k  and  l c  are identified  l ∀ , 2) there is enough interneighborhood variation in  () ni Y  
to ensure that  l d  and  l J  are identified  l ∀  because of the nonlinear relationship between 
contextual effects and endogenous effects, and 3) there is no collinearity between the regressors 
contained in i X  and   () ni Y .  
One interesting difference between the binary and multinomial choice cases is that for the 
multinomial choice case, there may be various zero restrictions on particular elements of     
,,, ll l l kcdJ .  For example, the direct effect of choice probabilities may be known to be zero for 
some choices but not for others. However, because the choices are comparative, a regressor that 
does not directly affect the utility of one choice will nevertheless affect the probability of its 
selection due to its affect on the utility associated with alternatives.  This suggests another route 
to identification that has yet to be exploited. 
IV. Extensions 
While our model of multinomial choice with neighborhood effects seems quite rich, an 
important extension to the model is the endogenizing of neighborhood memberships.  As made 
clear by the theoretical literature, endogenous sorting is an important aspect of the behaviors we  11 
wish to model.  We believe that a nested logit model in which neighborhoods are first chosen, 
and with behaviors chosen once the neighborhood memberships are determined can address this 
limitation to the framework.  
Further, as well discussed in Manski (2000) and Moffitt (2001), endogenous 
neighborhood choice has important implications for econometric implementation of models of 
neighborhood effects.  Yet endogeneity of neighborhood memberships need not be an 
impediment to identifying neighborhood effects.  Brock and Durlauf (2001b) in fact show, that 
self-selection into neighborhoods, when correctly specified, can facilitate identification via the 
creation of additional determinants of individual behavior in linear models and/or by inducing 
nonlinearities in individual behavior, each of which eliminates possible collinearity between 
contextual effects and endogenous effects. An important related approach is due to Ivar Ekelund, 
James Heckman and Lars Nesheim (2001,2002) who show how prices associated with 
neighborhood memberships contain important information that may be used to uncover 
neighborhood effects.  
Our own view is that progress on the empirical analysis of neighborhood effects is most 
likely achieved through a tight connection between theory and econometrics, and so our current 
work on these outstanding problems reflects the modeling approach we have described here.  12 
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